Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with a finite number of decoy states is analyzed under finite-data-size assumption. By accounting for statistical fluctuations in parameter estimation, we investigate vacuum+weak-and vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocols. In each case, we find proper operation regimes, where the performance of our system is comparable to the asymptotic case for which the key size and the number of decoy states approach infinity.
I. INTRODUCTION
based on the idea of entanglement swapping using a BSM and the reverse EPR QKD scheme [34] [35] [36] . The scheme is secure even if Eve intentionally makes the wrong measurement and/or announces the wrong information. Various implementation approaches to MDI-QKD have also been proposed [37, 38] , and significant efforts have been devoted to its experimental demonstration [33, 39, 40] . Recently, the first MDI-QKD experiment with decoy states is completed by Liu et al. [41] .
MDI-QKD is not completely device independent and the source devices have to be trusted and sufficiently characterized. When we use a coherent source to implement a single-photonbased MDI-QKD scheme, such as that in Ref. [33] , we need to estimate the single-photon contributions of the detection at the receiver, which can be done efficiently using decoy states [42] [43] [44] [45] . In [33] , a security analysis is provided for the decoy-state MDI-QKD assuming infinitely long keys with infinitely many decoy states. In this paper, we proceed further and analyze the performance of decoy-state MDI-QKD when only a finite number of decoy states are used. Moreover, we consider statistical fluctuations caused by a finite-size key. Such an analysis is crucial to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in practical setups.
We note that the effect of finite size on MDI-QKD has also been recently studied in an independent work by Song et al. [46] . However, they only analyzed the vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol whereas we also analyze the vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocol here taking advantage of our general method which can easily be adapted to other decoystate protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we briefly review the MDI-QKD scheme with decoy states. In Sec. III, we investigate the QKD model for the security proof and simulation. In Sec. IV, we perform a statistical fluctuation analysis on MDI-QKD systems, followed by numerical results in Sec. V. We conclude the paper in Sec. VI with remarks.
II. DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD
The most general encoding scheme for BB84-based QKD relies on using two optical orthogonal modes. Here, we encode a qubit in the z basis by using two spatially separated modes, r and s, as shown in Fig. 1 . That is, for the z basis, the information is encoded in whether the photon is in mode r or s. The qubit can also be encoded into the relative phases between modes r and s. Denote x basis to be the case when two relative phases {0, π} are used and y basis for {π/2, 3π/2}. This encoding is sufficiently general to be tailored down to all proposed MDI-QKD schemes. For example, in the original MDI-QKD [33] , r and s correspond to H and V polarizations. For BB84 encoding, the z and x basis is used [33] . We remark that this setup can be used to implement the six-state QKD protocol as well [47] .
For practical purposes, one may consider using temporal, rather than the spatial, modes as proposed in [38, 39] . Here, however, we are mostly concerned with statistical fluctuation effects due to the finite size of the key, and our results are independent of the employed setup.
The key assumption in all MDI-QKD schemes is that the photons on which the intermediary BSM is performed are indistinguishable. We assume this condition is held throughout our analysis.
In this paper, we assume that Alice and Bob use coherent states as their sources and use the z and x basis above for encoding. The MDI-QKD scheme runs as follows.
1. Alice randomly chooses a basis from {x, z} and a bit from {0, 1}, and sends a coherentstate pulse with intensity randomly chosen from a predetermined set. As shown in Fig. 1 , if she picks the z basis, she prepares her coherent states with either H or V polarizations depending on the bit value. Otherwise, if she picks the x basis, she prepares +45-polarized signals, splits the pulse into two modes, r and s, through a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), and encodes the bit values into relative phases, {0, π}, between the two modes. Bob applies the same encoding procedure.
2. Alice and Bob send the pulses to the relay, which can be fully controlled by Eve. Eve performs a partial BSM on the received pulses, as shown in Fig. 1 . Eve announces her detection results. She is allowed to be dishonest.
3. Alice and Bob compare the bases used for all transmissions which include the nodetection events, successful BSM events, and unsuccessful BSM events. 4 . Based on Eve's announcement for each pulse, Alice and Bob keep the bit if it corresponds to a successful BSM event and a compatible basis has been used. One of them also flips the bit value in the case of an anticorrelated BSM result (see Fig. 1 ).
They discard all other bits corresponding to the no-detection events, unsuccessful BSM events, and those with incompatible bases. The phase shifts are chosen from the set {0, π} for the x basis and {π/2, 3π/2} for the y basis.
A partial BSM, possibly performed by an untrusted party, Eve or Charlie, on the two reference and the two signal modes would establish correlations between the raw key bits of Alice and Bob.
If they both use the z basis, a click on exactly one of the r detectors and exactly one of the s detectors would imply anti-correlated bits shared between Alice and Bob. For x and y bases, if they both use the same basis, a joint click on detectors r 0 and s 0 implies identical bits for Alice and Bob; so does a joint click on r 1 and s 1 . A joint click on r 0 and s 1 , or, r 1 and s 0 would imply anticorrelated bits [38] . The analysis in the last step is the main focus of this work.
III. MODEL
The notations and definitions used in the model are listed below.
• Alice and Bob each use coherent states to implement decoy-state MDI-QKD. In addition to the signal state, different intensities will be used for a number of decoy states.
In this section, we denote the mean number of photons in a certain pulse sent by Alice and Bob, respectively, by µ and ν. In subsequent sections, we introduce a more detailed notation as needed for decoy states.
• We use the term "i-photon channel" when a Fock state with i photons is used as information carrier. We denote the joint channel when Alice uses an i-photon channel and Bob uses a j-photon channel by i ⊎ j channel, where i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . When there is no ambiguity, we use µ ⊎ ν channel to represent the case when Alice and Bob send out coherent states with intensities µ and ν, respectively.
• The overall gain Q w µν is defined as the probability of obtaining a successful partial BSM when Alice and Bob use the µ ⊎ ν channel and the w basis, where w = x, z. The quantum bit error rate (QBER) E w µν is the corresponding error probability.
• The yield Y w ij is the probability to obtain a successful BSM when Alice and Bob use the i ⊎ j channel and the w basis, where w = x, z, and e w ij is the corresponding error probability. The gain Q w ij is defined as the probability that Alice and Bob use the i ⊎ j channel and obtain a successful partial BSM.
• Denote the transmittance of the channel between Alice (Bob) and the relay to be η a (η b ). Denote the dark count of each detector by p d .
• We assume the phase modulator (PM) and PBS devices at Alice and Bob are perfect.
A. Photon-number channel model
When the phases of the coherent states used by Alice and Bob are randomized, the quantum channel can be modeled as a photon-number channel model [43] . That is, Alice and Bob randomly choose quantum channels (with a Poisson distribution) with different Fock states. Thus, the gain and QBER is composed of all the possible i ⊎ j-channels,
where w = x, z.
In the security proof, we assume that Eve has a full control of Y 
B. Asymptotic case
In this section, we present the expected values for the parameters of interest if an infinitely long key is used. These analytical results can be obtained if we assume that the system is operating under normal conditions. We emphasize that the results of this simulation model can only be used for simulation purposes, but not for the security proof. For the postmeasurement processing of a real QKD experiment, the key rate and the actual key are derived from the measurement outcomes, which also include possible Eve's intervention.
Here, we directly take the results from the Appendixes of Ref. [38] . The observables we need to use for the simulation are the following gains and QBERs:
and
where
In the above equations, I 0 (x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind, e d represents the misalignment-error probability, e 0 = 1/2, and
We also need the gain of single-photon states, Q w 11 , w = x, z, given by
Without Eve's intervention, the yield and error rate of the 1 ⊎ 1 channel are given by
which will be used for the simulation of the asymptotic case.
IV. POST PROCESSING A. Key rate
The key rate is given by [33, 43] ,
where I ec is the cost of error correction, f is the error correction efficiency, and H(e) = −e log 2 (e) − (1 − e) log 2 (1 − e) is the binary Shannon entropy function. We assume that the final key is extracted from the data measured in the z basis. Note that, for single-photon states, the phase error probability in the z basis is the bit error probability in the x basis, e x 11 , since single photons form a basis-independent source [48] . Our objective is to solve the following [49] :
subject to separately [50] . Both these problems can be solved using linear programming, and that will provide us with a lower bound on the optimal value that one can find by directly solving the nonlinear minimization problem in Eq. (9) . Note that, even in our simplified approach, one must deal with an infinite number of unknowns in Y 
2 when considering Y w ij = 1 and assuming that µ = µ k = µ l . Fig. 2 shows τ (µ, k) for three nominal values of µ and k = 6, . . . , 11. It We follow the statistical fluctuation analysis proposed in Ref. [44] . Then, the equalities in Eq. (10) becomes inequalities,
where if the left hand side of the inequality is negative, we replace it with 0. The variables,
are measurement outcomes. That is, they are rates instead of probabilities.
The fluctuation ratio β q and β eq can be evaluated by
where N BSMs when Alice and Bob use intensities µ k and ν l , respectively, and
is the corresponding error count. If we follow the Gaussian assumption made in [44] , the number of standard deviations, n α , will be directly related to the failure probability of this security analysis. For example, when n α = 5, as used later, it will introduce a failure probability of 5.73 × 10 −7 .
V. SIMULATION
For simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob send the same number of pulses for all µ ⊎ ν channels, denoted by N data . In the following simulations, the parameters of the experimental setup are listed in Table I .
1.5% 3 × 10 −6 1.16 2 × 10 10 N data is the number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob for each pair of intensities.
In the simulation, we absorb the detection loss into channel losses. Note that with the current development in high-speed QKD systems [51] [52] [53] , N data = 2 × 10 10 pulses can be transmitted in seconds. We assume that Alice and Bob pick n α standard deviations for the statistical fluctuation analysis, which is determined by the allowable failure probability for the system.
A. Vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol
We consider that Alice and Bob run the vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol [44] and they choose the same intensities for the coherent states. Let us assume a typical set of intensities:
{0, 0.1, 0.5}. Note that we assume N data = 2 × 10 10 for each µ ⊎ ν channel. Thus, the total number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob is 18 × 10 10 .
For each of the nine µ⊎ν channels, Alice and Bob can obtain a set of linear inequalities, in the form of Eq. (11), for gains and QBERs. As noted before, we neglect terms with i, j ≥ 7, and find the lower bound on Y z 11 and the upper bound on e x 11 using linear programming. In order to obtain a sense of the magnitude of the parameter values, we calculate the gains and QBERs, at η a = η b = 0.1, using Eqs. (2) and (3) for the x and z basis. The gain values are listed in Table II decoy state is 1/2 and that of the remaining four nontrivial cases is shown in Table III , for the x and z basis. Note that the QBER in the z basis is reasonably close to e d as expected from Eqs. (3) and (7). The QBER in the x basis, on the other hand, is larger than 25%, which is mainly caused by false triggering of multiphoton states [33, 38] . This is the key reason why the final key in Eq. (8) should be only extracted from the z basis. Tables II and III Similarly, one can evaluate the dependence of the key rate on channel transmittance, as shown in Fig. 3 . One can see that even by including statistical fluctuations the key rate decreases linearly with channel loss before the cut-off regime. In the low-loss regime, the vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol performs almost as well as the asymptotic case. As shown in Fig. 3 , with n α = 5 standard deviations, the maximum tolerable transmission loss is almost 30 dB less than that of the asymptotic case. Even if we do not take the statistical fluctuations (n α = 0) into account, there is still a gap between the two cases.
Thus, there is big room for further improvement. In the next simulation, we will consider three decoy states and show that further improvements can be made when more decoy states are applied.
B. Vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocol
In order to give a better estimation of Y Table V . Again, the parameter estimations in the x basis is worse than those in the z basis, due to the multiphoton terms. Similar to the vacuum+weak-decoy-state case, one can calculate the key rate to be 1.09 ×
10
−4 bits/pulse by substituting the parameter estimations from The dependence of the key rate on the channel transmittance is shown in Fig. 4 . One can see that the gap between the finite-size case and the asymptotic case is smaller than the one shown in Fig. 3 . In the case of n α = 0, the vacuum+two-weak-decoy-state protocol is very close to the asymptotic case. This is different from regular decoy-state protocol, where two decoy states are proven to be sufficient for practical usage [44] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that MDI-QKD is a highly practical scheme even when the statistical fluctuations are accounted for. In the low-loss regime, with only two or three decoy states, the performance of MDI-QKD with statistical fluctuations is close to that of the asymptotic case. At higher values of loss, using three decoy states would be recommended. We remark that our analysis is quite general and is applicable to different MDI-QKD implementations such as those based on phase encoding and/or polarization encoding as well as those those based on the BB84 protocol or the six-state protocol.
